India has signed 15 agreements involving critical minerals since January 2025. The surge is part of a much larger shift in international economic diplomacy. Governments are increasingly using trade agreements, memorandums of understanding (MoUs) and bilateral cooperation frameworks to secure supplies of lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, copper and rare earth elements. These minerals are essential for everything from electric vehicle batteries and wind turbines to electricity grids and semiconductors.

An analysis by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), based on its updated Trade & Climate Tracker, has identified 211 trade and economic agreements signed between January 2025 and September 2026 that contain provisions addressing critical minerals, energy, climate governance or heavy industry decarbonisation. Of these, 139, or nearly two-thirds, involve critical raw materials (CRMs).

The findings, released just ahead of COP31 in Antalya, Türkiye, that gets underway on 9 November, point to an important development: trade is becoming an increasingly significant arena for climate action. But they also reveal a gap between countries' determination to secure the materials needed for the green transition and their willingness to make climate commitments part of those arrangements.

India's 15 critical minerals-related agreements reflect a growing recognition that its clean energy ambitions depend on securing access to resources that are either unavailable or insufficiently available domestically.

The seven-year mission, running from 2024-25 to 2030-31, allocates Rs 16,300 crore for government expenditure. It also aims to encourage another Rs 18,000 crore in investment by public sector undertakings (PSUs). Among its targets are 1,200 domestic exploration projects led by the Geological Survey of India, and securing 26 foreign mining assets via PSUs and 24 via the private sector.

More recently, India has expanded cooperation with other economies, including Germany and Norway, on critical minerals, supply chain diversification, research, processing and recycling.

The objective is to develop the capacity to process minerals, manufacture higher-value products and establish a stronger domestic industrial ecosystem.

The IISD analysis suggests that resource-rich countries around the world are also attempting to develop these capabilities.

Why governments are abandoning the traditional trade deal

One of the more striking findings of the IISD analysis is the speed and informality with which countries are pursuing these partnerships.

Of the 139 critical minerals-related agreements, 95, or 68%, take the form of MoUs, cooperation frameworks, joint statements or similar instruments rather than conventional free trade agreements (FTAs).

The reason is relatively straightforward. FTAs can take years to negotiate because they cover multiple sectors, from agriculture and manufacturing to financial services. They also often require lengthy domestic approval and ratification processes.

An MoU can be negotiated in months and focus on a narrower set of priorities. It can also signal political commitment and provide reassurance to investors, potentially paving the way for more substantial agreements later.

For governments worried about losing access to strategically important resources, speed matters.

India's growing network of partnerships reflects elements of both strategies: securing reliable supplies while developing domestic capabilities in processing, manufacturing and recycling.

But the growing popularity of MoUs comes with a significant weakness. These instruments are generally not legally binding, and their implementation often depends on arrangements that may not be clearly defined.

Transparency is another problem. IISD found that 39% of critical minerals-related agreements do not have publicly available texts.

That makes it difficult for investors, researchers and affected communities to determine what governments have actually committed to, let alone whether those commitments are being honoured.

The climate ambition gap

For all the talk of securing minerals for the green transition, the report identifies a striking disconnect between critical minerals diplomacy and explicit climate commitments.

Of the 60 agreements centred primarily on critical minerals, only one includes additional energy provisions. Eight address cooperation related to heavy industry, while none include provisions on broader climate governance.

This is ironic because critical minerals are essential for the energy transition and for emissions control. But while an agreement to secure lithium for batteries may support the expansion of electric vehicles, it might yet accept lithium that is not mined responsibly, processed using clean energy or produced without damaging local ecosystems.

The wider Trade & Climate Tracker reveals that climate-related cooperation is happening alongside the minerals agreements. Across the 211 agreements, IISD identified provisions relating to energy in 109 agreements, climate governance in 66 and heavy industry decarbonisation and circularity in 40.

But agreements on climate-related cooperation do not necessarily overlap with the critical minerals agreements.

As Alice Tipping, Director of Trade and Sustainable Development at IISD, puts it: “Though critical minerals cooperation isn’t driven by climate goals alone, trade deals increasingly focus on access to these resources, the energy transition and security, and supply chain diversification, while producer countries are also using them to capture a fairer share of value at home.”

Why trade matters to climate action

Trade has always influenced the pace and direction of industrial development. It determines which countries can access technologies, raw materials and investment, and which industries can compete in international markets.

For the energy transition, this is particularly important because no country has all the resources, technologies and manufacturing capabilities needed to build a low-carbon economy independently.

Solar panels, batteries, wind turbines and electricity grids depend on complex international supply chains. Trade agreements can reduce barriers to accessing these technologies, encourage investment and facilitate the movement of goods and services needed to decarbonise economies.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) recognises trade policy as an important part of the climate action toolbox. Its work on trade and climate change notes that climate change can negatively impact trade by disrupting distribution and supply chains and raising trade costs. It highlights how governments can use measures such as lower tariffs on environmental goods, standards, regulations and trade facilitation to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy.

The OECD has similarly identified access to critical raw materials, sustainable supply chains and trade in environmental goods and services as important areas where trade and environmental policies can reinforce each other.

Poorly coordinated trade policies, competing subsidies and restrictions on exports have, however, created new barriers, increased costs and disadvantaged some countries.

For India, the challenge is to secure the minerals and technologies needed for its energy transition without becoming overly dependent on a handful of suppliers. At the same time, it must ensure that its own industrial ambitions translate into domestic manufacturing, jobs and technological capabilities.

Turning mineral diplomacy into climate action

The IISD report identifies three priorities for governments seeking to make the growing wave of critical minerals agreements deliver meaningful economic and environmental benefits.

First, partnerships must create more value in producing countries.

Second, critical minerals cooperation needs to be explicitly connected to climate goals. Agreements should include commitments to reduce emissions from mining and processing, encourage renewable energy use, improve environmental standards and support affected regions through transition finance and skills development.

Third, governments must make their agreements public. Without access to the actual texts, it is difficult to assess whether commitments are meaningful, monitor progress or hold governments and companies accountable.

This is particularly important for communities living near mining and processing operations. They bear many of the environmental and social costs of mineral extraction, but may have little visibility into the international agreements shaping their land and lives.

The energy transition will be built on minerals. Whether it also delivers a fairer and more sustainable global economy will depend, in no small measure, on the trade agreements being written today.